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COVENANTS: CALIFORNIA'S NEW
LEGISLATIVE APPROACH TO COVENANTS
RUNNING WITH THE LAND
On July 18, 1968, California amended section 1468 of the Civil
Code' and thereby modified to a considerable extent the law of cov-
enants running with the land at law. Prior to that date California
had been recognized as occupying a unique position in the law of
covenants. 2 The purpose of this comment is to show how California
has been drawn from its unique position toward the mainstream of
common law covenants. Additionally, an attempt is made to put
into perspective the effect of this statute on existing California law
and to examine some inconsistencies resulting from the change.
PRIOR CALIFORNIA LAW
A real covenant, in contrast to a personal covenant, runs with
the land;I that is, when it is so related to the land, or so "touches
and concerns the land" that its benefit or burden passes with the
ownership irrespective of the consent of subsequent assignees. 4
Commentators agree that to enable a covenant to run with the land
four requirements must be met.5 First, the covenant must be proper
as to form.' Second, the parties must intend that the covenant run
or bind their assignees. 7 Third, "privity of estate" must exist between
the grantor and grantee of the land conveyed.' Fourth, the nature
of the covenant must be such that it relates to the land or "touches
1 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1468 (West Supp. 1968).
2 See Burby, Land Burdens in California-Covenants Running with the Land,
4 S. CAL. L. REV. 343, 355 (1931); Clark, The American Law Institute's Law of Real
Covenants, 52 YALE L.J. 699, 731 (1931).
3 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 437 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
4 21 C.J.S. Covenants § 54 (1940). The land may be that property retained by
the grantor or conveyed to a grantee, at least at common law.
5 C. CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND 94 (2d ed. 1947);
3 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 441-70 (3d ed. 1939); See also, W. BURBY, REAL PROP-
ERTY 97-98 (3d ed. 1965).
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 At common law, privity of estate is considered the basic requirement for a re-
placement. C. 'CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING wiTH LAND 92 (2d ed.
1947) ; W. BumBY, REAL PROPERTY 98 (3d ed. 1965). The concept of privity of estate
is a legal device which is used by common law courts to limit the parties who may
be bound by covenants running with the land. The policy of a jurisdiction regarding
the running of covenants is usually manifested in the meaning attributed to privity of
estate.
There are basically two meanings of "privity of estate" frequently discussed. The
first is referred to as mutual privity which had its roots in the feudal concept of the
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and concerns" the land.9 Once the grantor satisfied the common law
requirements of covenants running with the land, he or his assignees
could enforce the covenant against the grantee and his assignees or
vice versa.
Real covenants were distinguished from personal covenants by
the "touch and concern" requirement, and the rights and duties of
the parties under real covenants were known as benefits and bur-
dens. 10 At common law, both the benefit and the burden of the
covenant were required to relate to the land or "touch and concern"
the land before the covenant was considered real, and thus to run
with the land. Whether the benefit or burden of a covenant "touches
and concerns" was determined by the effect on the covenantor of
the covenantee's interest in the land." Correlative tests were applied
to make such a determination. On the one hand, if the value of the
covenantee's interest in the land increased by virtue of the cov-
enant, then the benefit "touched and concerned" the land. On the
other hand, if the value of the covenantor's interest in the land
decreased, then the burden of the covenant "touched and concerned"
the land. Furthermore, it was immaterial at common law whether
the covenant imposed an affirmative or negative duty on the cov-
enantor.12
Prior to 1968, covenants in California would run with the land
at law only in three specific situations.' 3 The first situation is gov-
tenurial relationship between the grantor and grantee. The prerequisite to finding
mutual privity is determining that there are two co-existing interests in the land.
After Quia Emptores, 18 Edw. I, cc. 1, 3 (1290), this was quite impossible in grants
of fees because subinfeudation was eliminated. California has adopted this view by
judicial decision. Los Angeles Terminal Land Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 68 P. 308
(1902) ; accord, Berryman v. Hotel Savoy Co., 160 Cal. 559, 117 P. 677 (1911). If Quia
Emptores abolished the mutual interests in the land, this meaning of privity of estate
is a nullity in grants of fees.
Perhaps the majority of American jurisdictions have adopted the second common
meaning of privity of estate. These jurisdictions find that the relationship between
the grantor and grantee is a sufficient basis for allowing covenants to run with the
land. They have adopted the term "successive privity." In reality, "successive privity"
is nothing more than a fiction which the courts use to support a covenant running at
law. W. BuRrY, REAL PROPERTY 98 (3d ed. 1965).
9 W. BuRBY, REAL PROPERTY 98 (3d ed. 1965); C. CLARK, COVENANTS AND
INTERESTS RUNNING wiTH LAND 96 (2d ed. 1947); 3 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 455
(3d ed. 1939).
10 C. CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND 97 (2d ed. 1947).
11 Id. A covenant which did not "touch and concern" the land was considered a
personal covenant and, therefore, not binding on the heirs or the assigns of the con-
tracting parties.
12 Annot., 41 A.L.R. 1363, 1364 (1926). For example, a covenant to provide
water to adjacent land by the grantor-covenantor was sustained as a real covenant
even though it amounted to an affirmative duty. Murphy v. Kerr, 5 F.2d 908 (8th Cir.
1925).
13 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1461 (West 1954). "The only covenants which run with the
land are those specified in this Title, and those which are incidental thereto."
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erned by section 1462 of the Civil Code' 4 which provides that every
covenant will run with the land, both as to the benefit and burden,
if the covenant is for the direct benefit of the property conveyed. 5
If, however, the covenant restricts rather than benefits the use of
the land conveyed, then it will not run.' 6 Thus, the California rule
held that the burden of a covenant will not run unless it is made for
the direct benefit of the land. For example, in Carlson v. Lindauer,17
the owner of the surface rights of a parcel of property agreed to a
covenant proposed by Union Oil, the owner of the oil rights under
the same parcel. The agreement provided: that Union search for
oil; that after five years, if no oil was found, Union would quit-
claim the oil rights to the owner of the surface rights; and, that if
oil was found, the owner would be entitled to royalties and surface
damages.18 The court held that the royalties themselves were incor-
poreal property rights, within the meaning of the word "property"
in section 1462, and that the covenant to quit-claim oil rights was
a direct benefit to the royalty interest conveyed.' 9 Therefore, the
covenant to quit-claim was a covenant running at law within the
requirements of section 1462 of the Civil Code."
The second instance in which covenants were held to run at
law was determined by applying the requirements of section 1468
of the Civil Code. Prior to 1968, section 146821 allowed one land-
owner to covenant with another to do or refrain from doing some
act which "is expressed to be for the benefit of the land of the
covenantee." In the landmark case of Marra v. Aetna Construction
14 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1462 (West 1954). "Every covenant contained in a grant of
an estate in real property, which is made for the direct benefit of the property, or
3ome part of it then in existence, runs with the land."
15 There was room for speculation as to whether the burden imposed upon the
land retained by the grantor would bind his successors in interest even where the
covenant confers a direct benefit on the property conveyed. This question, although
never resolved by the California courts, has become moot with the amendment of
;ection 1468 of the 'Civil Code. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1468 (West Supp. 1968).
16 Los Angeles Terminal Land Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 68 P. 308 (1902);
iccord, Long v. Cramer Meat & Packing Co., 155 Cal. 402, 101 P. 297 (1909) ; Marra
. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940).
17 119 Cal. App. 2d 292, 259 P.2d 925 (1953).
18 Id. at 297-99, 259 P.2d at 927-28.
19 Id. at 304-05, 259 P.2d at 931-32.
20 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF ICALIFORNIA LAW 1042 (7th ed. 1960). Although
,:here are few cases concerning beneficial real covenants in fees, other examples are
,:ovenants for title, to insure, and to release a mortgage. Id.
21 Ch. 450, § 1, p. 610, [1905] Cal. Stats., as amended, CAL. Civ. CODE § 1468
:West Supp. 1968): "A covenant by the owner of land to do or refrain from doing
:iome act on his own land, which doing or refraining is expressed to be for the
benefit of the land of the covenantee, and which is made by the covenantor expressly
!or his assigns or to the assigns of the covenantee, runs with both of such parcels of
I and."
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Company,22 plaintiff, the grantor's assignee, argued unsuccessfully
that a burden, in the form of building restrictions, could run at
law under section 1.468 of the Civil Code. The California Supreme
Court refused to obligate the defendant-grantee and held that sec-
tion 1468 applies only to covenants between present landowners,
thus excluding covenants contained in a deed from a grantor to a
grantee.
The third case in which covenants will run is expressed in
section 1464 of the Civil Code." This section states that a covenant
will run at law if it provides for the addition of some new thing to
real property, or for the benefit of some part of the property not
then in existence.2 4 In addition, a covenant contained in a grant of
an estate of property must be made expressly for the assignees of
the parties. In Matin County Hospital District v. Cicurel,25 the
appellate court held that although a covenant for ingress and egress
did confer something new on the land, the covenant failed because
it did not expressly state that it was to bind the assignees of the
parties.
This short summary of California law indicates that both the
California Legislature and the state judiciary have been reluctant
to allow covenants conferring a burden on property to run at law.
The apparent motivation for the rule is that onerous covenants
tend to restrain alienation and curtail the marketability of free-
holds.26
California courts have refused to uphold burdensome covenants
at law not only on the authority of section 1462,27 but also because
the courts found no privity of estate existing between grantor and
grantee. California's restrictive view of privity, in accord with
22 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940). The case has been criticized as making an
unwarranted technical distinction between covenants of owners and covenants in
grants. 28 CALF. L. REV. 769 (1940).
23 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1464 (West 1954): "A covenant for the addition of some new
thing to real property, or for the direct benefit of some part of the property not then
in existence or annexed thereto, when contained in a grant of an estate in such
property, and made by the covenantor expressly for his assigns or to the assigns of
the covenantee, runs with land so far only as assigns thus mentioned are concerned."
24 This is nothing more than a codification of the common law rule of Spencer's
Case. 2 B. WiTXrK, SUMMARY OF CALiFORNiA LAW 1040 (7th ed. 1960). If that which
the covenant concerns is not in existence in the estate then the covenant must expressly
bind the assignees.
25 154 Cal. App. 2d 294, 301, 316 P.2d 32, 37 (1957).
26 28 CALIF. L. REV. 769 (1940).
27 Los Angeles Terminal Land Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 68 P. 308 (1902);
accord, Berryman v. Hotel Savoy Co., 160 Cal. 559, 117 P. 677 (1911). See discussion
note 8 supra.
28 Id.
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England and a few American jurisdictions, is based on the reasoning
that since the statute Quia Emptores"9 eliminated subinfeudation,
privity of estate no longer exists between a grantor and grantee of
a fee. 0 Elimination of privity precluded the running of burdens in
all situations except for those specifically provided for in the Cal-
ifornia statutes.
When a covenant imposing a burden on the land conveyed
cannot be upheld at law, the California courts will often uphold
it on equitable principles.8 Such covenants are often referred to
as equitable servitudes or restrictive covenants. The doctrine orig-
inated in an English case, Tulk v. Moxhay,82 where the grantee
took the land with notice of certain burdensome covenants imposed
upon the land. The court reasoned that since the grantee may have
received the land at a reduced price, his breach of the covenant
amounted to an unjust enrichment. Since there was no adequate
remedy at law, equity stepped in to enforce the covenant. Today,
equitable servitudes or restrictive covenants have a tremendous
practical utility and are widely used in California."
CIVIL CODE SECTION 1468
Prior to 1968, section 1468 provided that burdensome covenants
could run at law only if created by existing owners of property. 4
In Marra v. Aetna Construction Company, 5 the Supreme Court of
California refused to allow an onerous covenant to run with the
land in the grantor-grantee situation. In interpreting section 1468
the court stated:
But it is apparent that this section of the code applies only to covenants
entered into between owners of property. Covenants, like the present
one, contained in a grant in fee of real property, are governed solely
by section 1462 of the Civil Code .... 36
The statute and the California courts have further required that
covenants between owners of property should expressly state that
29 18 Edw. I, cc. 1, 3 (1290).
80 See discussion note 8 supra.
31 Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 P. 945 (1919); see Robertson v. Nichols,
92 'Cal. App. 2d 201, 206 P.2d 898 (1949); Miles v. Clark, 44 Cal. App. 539, 187 P.
167 (1919).
82 2 Phillips 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848).
33 Equitable servitudes are a valuable tool in regulation of tract developments.
MacEllven, Land Use Control Through Covenants, 13 HAsmxos L.J. 310 (1962).
34 Ch. 450, § 1, p. 610, [1905] Cal. Stats., as amended, 'CAL. CiV. CODE § 1468
(West Supp. 1968).
35 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940).
86 Id. at 377, 101 P.2d at 492.
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they exist for the benefit of the land of the covenantee.37 Addition-
ally, the statute required that the covenant be expressly for the
assignees of the covenantee and covenantor."8 The effect of the
Marra case was to make it impossible for the burden of a covenant
contained in a grant of a fee to run with the land at law.3"
Some twenty-eight years after Marra the legislature responded.
Encouraged by land and title associations,4 ° it adopted Assembly
Bill 1054, 41 proposed by Assemblyman Harvey Johnson, as an
amendment to section 1468 of the Civil Code. The interest of the
land and title associations was similar to the concern generated
prior to the passage of the original Civil Code sections 1469 and
1470.42 Prior to 1953 there was some confusion as to whether a
burden would run in a lease situation where a developer of a com-
mercial shopping center had covenanted to do or refrain from doing
some act on property other than the leased premises.43 Covenants
posing problems were those in which the owner of the shopping
center would promise not to lease to a competitor of the lessee, to
pay taxes on the common parking lot, or undertake other affirma-
tive or negative duties.4" To clarify this uncertainty sections 1469
and 1470 were passed.
Section 1469 binds the lessor and his assignees to any affirma-
tive covenants which the lessor may provide for in the lease.45 Sec-
tion 1470 binds a lessor to his negative covenants.4 Note that under
'37 Moe v. Gier, 116 Cal. App. 403, 410-11, 2 P.2d 852, 855 (1931); accord,
Barbieri v. Ongaro, 208 Cal. App. 2d 753, 756, 25 Cal. Rptr. 471, 473 (1962).
38 Ch. 450, § 1, p. 610, [1905] Cal. Stats., as amended, 'CAL. CIV. CODE § 1468
(West Supp. 1968).
39 Letter from David E. MacEllven, Vice President and Counsel of Western Title
Insurance Company to Carl E. Weidman, Executive Vice President of the California
Land Title Co., March 8, 1968, copy on file in the office of the Santa Clara Lawyer.
40 Id.
41 A.B. 1054, 1968 'Cal. Stats. Reg. Sess. 1 (1968).
42 Ch. 652, § 1, p. 1903, [1953] Cal. Stats., as amended, CAL. CIv. CODE § 1469
(West Supp. 1968); Ch. 652, § 2, p. 1904 [1953] Cal. Stats., as amended, CAL. Civ.
CODE § 1470 (West Supp. 1968).
43 CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA LAND SECURITY
AND DVELOPMENT, 871 (1960). See also 2 B. WiTxiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW
1042 (7.th ed. 1960). "Although privity is present in an estate for years . . . the
California cases generally treat leases 'as grants of an estate,' thus making CC. 1462
and 1463 applicable to covenants in leases."
4 Cf. Bialkin and Bohannon, Covenants Not to Establish a Competing Business
-Does the Benefit Pass?, 41 VA. L. REV. 675 (1955). The authors discuss the issue
whether courts will enforce the benefit of a covenant not to compete in an action by
the assignee of the covenantee. The authors point out that there is little consistency in
this area of the law.
45 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1469 (West Supp. 1968). "Each covenant made by the lessor
in a lease of real property to do any act or acts on other real property which is owned
by the lessor .... "
46 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1470 (West Supp. 1968). "Each covenant made by the lessor
[Vol. 9
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both sections the lessor is bound to covenants pertaining to his con-
tiguous land not demised under a lease. Practically, this meant
that a lessee could now rely on the courts to enforce a covenant
not to lease contiguous property to a competitor no matter how
many times ownership of the fee changed hands.
Many current shopping center land transactions are effectuated
by conveyances of a fee rather than leases. Consequently, pur-
chasers desired the same statutory protection available to lessees.
With this in mind, the land title associations pressed for legislative
action to obtain the benefits of sections 1469 and 1470 for grantees.
47
As a result, section 1468 was amended to provide for the running
of covenants of the grantor; specifically, covenants to do or refrain
from doing some act on the grantor's land. The amended language
of section 1468 was adopted almost entirely from sections 1469 and
1470 and explicitly states that each covenant of the grantor with
the grantee of the land conveyed runs with the land.48 Further, the
amended section now provides that such covenant binds the grantor
and his assignees to both the affirmative and negative burdens stip-
ulated in the covenant. Because a grantor's covenant will now run
in a lease of real property not to use or permit to be used contrary to the terms of
such lease any other real property which is owned by the lessor .... "
47 'CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, REVIEW OF SELECTED 1968
CODE LEGISLATION 34 (1968).
48 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1468 (West Supp. 1968) now provides: "Each covenant,
made by an owner of land with the owner of other land or made by a grantor of land
with the grantee of land conveyed, to do or refrain from doing some act on his own
land, which doing or refraining is expressed to be for the benefit of the land of the
covenantee, runs with both the land owned by the covenantor and the land owned
by or granted to the covenantee and shall, except as provided by section 1466, or as
specifically provided in the instrument creating such covenant, and notwithstanding
the provisions of section 1465, benefit or be binding upon each successive owner, during
his ownership, of any portion of such land affected thereby and upon each person
having any interest therein derived through any owner thereof where all of the fol-
lowing requirements are met:
(a) The land of the covenantor which is to be affected by such covenants, and
the land of covenantee to be benefited, are particularly described in the instrument
containing such covenants;
(b) Such successive owners of the land are in instrument expressed to be bound
thereby for the benefit of the land owned by or granted to the covenantee;
(c) Each such act relates to the use, repair, maintenance or improvement of, or
payment of taxes and assessments on, such land or some part thereof;
(d) The instrument containing such covenants is recorded in the office of the
recorder of each county in which such land or some part thereof is situate.
Where several persons are subject to the burden of any such covenant, it shall be
apportioned among them pursuant to Section 1467, except that where only a portion
of such land is so affected thereby, such apportionment shall be only among the several
owners of such portions. This section shall apply to the mortgagee, trustee, or
beneficiary of a mortgage or deed of trust upon such land or any part thereof while
but only while he, in such capacity, is in possession thereof.
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with the land, the ruling in the Marra case is at least partially
nullified.4
9
Along with the above major provisions, section 1468 has numer-
ous specific requirements which must be met before a convenant will
be enforced. The covenant must be made explicitly for the benefit of
the land of the covenantee.5 ° Both the property of the covenantor
and that of the covenantee must be specifically described in the in-
strument.5 Successive owners of the land burdened must be ex-
pressly bound by the covenant.52 Duties prescribed in the covenant
must relate to the land or some part of it. 5 The instrument, a deed
in the grantor-grantee situation, or memorandum in the owner-to-
owner transaction, must be recorded in the county in which the land
is located.54 Also, section 1468 is expressly limited by sections 1466"5
and 146756 of the Civil Code. The former provides that a subsequent
purchaser is not liable for a previous owner's breach of covenant.
The amended statute also makes specific reference to section 1467
of the Civil Code which provides that where several persons are sub-
ject to the burden or entitled to the benefit of a covenant it must be
apportioned among them according to the value of the property or
the quantum of their interest.
However, section 1465 of the Civil Code, 57 which provides that
an assignee of the covenantor cannot be bound by a covenant unless
he acquires the covenantor's entire interest in the property, is ex-
pressly made inapplicable to section 1468.58 Thus, it appears that an
assignee of a covenantor may be bound by a covenant which meets
49 Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940) is only
partially nullified in that the court interpreted section 1468 as not applying to the
running of covenants in grants. The present amendment allows only covenants of
grantors to run whether they are burdensome or beneficial. The amendment makes no
mention of the onerous covenants of the grantee. Marra dealt with a burdensome
covenant of the grantee.
50 CAL. CIV. 'ConE § 1468 (West Supp. 1968).
51 Id. § 1468(a).
52 Id. § 1468(b).
53 Id. § 1468(c).
54 Id. § 1468(d).
55 CAL. CIV. 'CoDE § 1466 (West 1954). "No one, merely by reason of having
acquired an estate subject to a covenant running with the land, is liable for a breach
of the covenant before he acquired the estate, or after he has parted with it or ceased
to enjoy its benefits."
56 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1467 (West 1954). "Where several persons, holding by
several titles, are subject to the burden or entitled to the benefit of a covenant running
with the land, it must be apportioned among them according to the value of the
property subject to it held by them respectively, if such value can be ascertained, and
if not, then according to their respective interests in point of quantity."
57 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1465 (West 1954). "A covenant running with the land binds
those only who acquire the whole estate of the covenantor in some part of the
property."
58 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1468 (West Supp. 1968).
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the requirements of section 1468 even though he has not acquired
the covenantor's entire interest. This is particularly significant in
the shopping center situation. Suppose, for example, a developer
conveys in fee a building and lot to a purchaser who wishes to estab-
lish a restaurant in a recently constructed shopping center. The pur-
chaser, fearing competition, requires from the grantor a covenant
that he will not use the land retained to compete with the purchaser.
Since 1465 is now inapplicable, a lessee of land, acquiring less than
a fee from the grantor would be bound by the covenant not to com-
pete. The lessee could not establish a restaurant in competition with
the previous purchaser without breaching the covenant.
Finally, section 1468 binds mortgagees, trustees, and bene-
ficiaries of mortgages, but only while acting in their respective capac-
ities, and only while in possession of the land. They must take actual
possession of the land to become personally liable for the breach of
a covenant. 59
THE LAW AFTER THE AMENDMENT To SECTION 1468
As previously mentioned, several commentators have clearly de-
fined the common law requirements for a covenant running with the
land.6" The first requirement is that the covenant be proper as to
form.61 Although the rule in early common law jurisdictions required
the covenant to be in a sealed instrument, modern practice in most
jurisdictions merely requires satisfaction of the statute of frauds, al-
though some jurisdictions require covenants to be contained in the
grant. But California, through section 1468 of the Civil Code, re-
quires that the written instrument must be recorded. It appears that
a mere memorandum will satisfy the requirements of 1468 if it is
recorded in the county in which the property is located. 2
At common law, the second requirement is that the parties must
intend that the covenant run with the land.63 Section 1468 prior to
the 1968 amendment, required an express manifestation of intent
by the provision "expressly for his assigns or to the assigns of the
59 Id.
60 W. BURBY, REAL PROPERTY 97-98 (3d ed. 1965); C. CLARK, COVENANTS AND
INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND 94 (2d ed. 1947); 3 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
441-70 (3d ed. 1939).
61 C. CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND 94 (2d ed. 1947).
62 CAL. CIV. 'CODE § 1468 (West Supp. 1968). A memorandum of the covenant
would suffice since there is no express requirement in section 1468 for a sealed instru-
ment. The section merely requires that the covenant be recorded in the county in
which the land is located.
63 C. CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTEREST RUNNING WITH LAND 94 (2d ed. 1947).
Clark maintains that manifestation of intent need not be expressed in any precise
form.
1969]
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covenantee."64 The 1968 amendment deleted this clause but retained
the requirement by incorporating it in other terms. Sub-section (b)
requires that "successive owners of the land are in such instrument
expressed to be bound." 15 When the covenantor says that his suc-
cessors shall be bound, he is, therefore, manifesting his intention to
create a real covenant and not merely a personal covenant. The third
pre-requisite in common law jurisdictions is "privity of estate" be-
tween grantor and grantee.66 "Privity" is a policy restriction on the
perpetuation of obligations in that it limits the enforcement of bur-
densome covenants to persons who have a "successive" interest in
the land or to persons who have a "mutual" interest in the land.
67
California took the latter restricted view of privity but concluded
that because of the elimination of subinfeudation, the mutual or
tenurial interest of the grantor and grantee in the land has been abol-
ished and only those covenants provided for by statute can run with
the land.68 The vagueness and confusion that has developed over the
terms "privity," "successive," and "mutual" in other jurisdictions
does not exist in California since the legislature has declared which
covenants will bind the assignees of the covenanting parties. The
statutes have thus set the policy limits of covenants running with the
land. By virtue of the 1968 amendment to section 1468, the legis-
lature has advanced beyond pre-existing policy limits by allowing
the burdensome real covenants of the grantor to bind his successors
in interest.69
Finally, the common law required that the covenant must
"touch and concern" the land.70 If the covenant can be considered
as intimately bound up in the land then it is said to "touch and con-
cern.'1 Section 1468 embodies the common law requirements by
specifically stating that a covenant must relate "to the use, repair,
maintenance or improvement of" the land.72
The new Amendment coincides with the common law in other
respects. At common law, both negative and affirmative covenants
would run with the land at law.7 3 Section 1468 states that a grantor
64 Ch. 450, § 1, p. 610, [1905] Cal. Stats., as amended, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1468
(West Supp. 1968).
'65 CAL. Crv. CODE § 1468(b) (West Supp. 1968).
66 C. CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND 111, 119 (2d ed.
1947).
67 See note 8 supra.
68 Id. This of course does not eliminate the mutuality of interest between landlord
and tenant, or between the owner of a fee and an easement holder.
69 'CAL. CrV. CODE § 1468 (West Supp. 1968).
70 C. CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND 96 (2d ed. 1947).
71 Id. at 99.
72 'CAL. Crv. CODE § 1468(c) (West Supp. 1968).
73 Annot., 41 A.L.R. 1363, 1364 (1926). California courts would reach the same
[Vol. 9
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may covenant "to do or refrain from doing" some act on his land. 74
Thus, California is in line with common law states providing that a
covenant imposing both affirmative as well as negative burdens on
the covenantor will run with the land. Another important parallel to
the law in other jurisdictions found in section 1468 is that the cov-
enantor will be liable only when the breach of his covenant occurs
during his ownership. 75 Similarly, the case law in other jurisdictions
provides that a covenantor is not liable for breaches of the covenant
after he has parted with title to the property.76
Common law jurisdictions distinguish between the burdensome
covenants of the grantor and the grantee.77 In either case, if the
covenants meet the traditional requirements they will run at law. The
California Legislature, however, for no apparent reason, has restricted
the running of covenants to those of the grantor. Section 1468 pro-
vides: "Each covenant made by ... a grantor ... expressed to be
for the benefit of the land of the covenantee runs with the land
owned by the covenantor and the land owned by or granted to the
covenantee. , ' 8
Where a stranger to the land, one not in privity of estate, cov-
enants to impose a benefit on the convenantee's land, the common
law authorities are divided as to whether such a covenant will run
with the land benefited. 79 Minnesota has taken the view that the as-
signees of the covenant can enforce the benefit against the cov-
enantor.80 Other jurisdictions, however, refuse to allow the benefit
to run because they find no privity of estate between the covenantor
and covenantee.81 But in no case will the burden run with the land of
the covenantor.82 California, by virtue of section 1468, has taken a
unique position, allowing both burdens and benefits of covenants
between owners of land to run at law. But at the same time the legis-
lature has retained an anomaly by allowing covenants of both
results as the federal court did in Murphy v. Kerr, 5 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1925), wherein
the grantor of tract A covenanted to pump water from tract B to tract A. In a suit
to quiet title by a subsequent grantee of tract B the federal court held that a covenant
imposing an affimative duty on the covenantor runs with the land as long as all the
requirements of a real covenant are met.
74 CAL. 'CIV. CODE § 1468 (West Supp. 1968).
75 Id.
76 Goldberg v. Nicola, 319 Pa. 183, 178 A. 809 (1935).
77 3 H. TnTANY, RA.L PROPERTY 443-44, 449-50 (3d ed. 1939).
78 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1468 (West Supp. 1968).
79 3 H. TnEyAY, REAL PROPERTY 444 (3d ed. 1939).
80 Shaber v. St. Paul Water Co., 30 Minn. 179, 14 N.W. 874 (1883); see Lingle
Water Users Ass'n v. Occidental Building & Loan Ass'n, 43 Wyo. 41, 297 P. 385
(1931) (by implication).
81 Lyon v. Parker, 45 Me. 474 (1858); Mygatt v. Coe, 124 N.Y. 212, 26 N.E. 611(1891) ; Tudor v. Jaca, 178 Ore. 126, 165 P.2d 770 (1946).
82 3 H. TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 448 (3d ed. 1939).
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grantors and owners to run while saving the grantee from the same
obligation.
SOME UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS
Though a strict interpretation would seemingly preclude bur-
dens from running to grantees, the statute might be subject to liberal
construction, thereby permitting such a result. For example, assume
that A conveys Blackacre in fee simple absolute to B. B covenants
to provide water for Whiteacre, land retained by A. B then conveys
to C. C discontinues water services to Whiteacre. Can A recover
damages for breach of covenant against C at law? The applicable
California statutory scheme provides: That only those covenants
which are specifically provided for by statute will run;
s3 that only
those covenants which are beneficial to the land conveyed run at law; 
84
and, that section 1468, as amended, allows each covenant of the
grantor and owner of the land to run. 5 In addition, case law prec-
edents have said that there is no privity of estate in the grant of a
fee. 6 In the hypothetical, C's covenant is neither beneficial to the
property conveyed, nor is it a covenant of a grantor or owner of
land. Furthermore, there is no privity of estate between A and C.
The authority against allowing the grantee's obligation to run seems
insurmountable.
As already pointed out, it appears illogical that real covenants
should be enforced in every circumstance except cases in which a
grantee is the covenantor. However, section 1468 may provide an
escape from the apparent inconsistency. Both the former and
amended versions of 1468 provide that the covenants of "owners"
would run. In the Marra decision the supreme court construed this
language as excluding burdensome covenants between grantor and
grantee.87 This construction has been criticized as being too re-
stricted and too technical. 8 What significant difference is there be-
tween a grantee who imposes a burden on his land and an owner who
imposes a burden on his land? The only difference is academic; an
instantaneous moment in time when the grantee accepts the grantor's
deed and becomes legal owner of the estate. Perhaps a more liberal
construction of section 1468 would solve this incongruity in the law;
83 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1461 (West 1954).
84 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1462 (West 1954); Los Angeles Terminal Land Co. v. Muir,
136 Cal. 36, 41, 68 P. 308, 309 (1902). This case determined that the property benefited
had to be the property conveyed. See also 28 CALIF. L. REV. 769 (1940).
85 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1468 (West Supp. 1968).
86 Los Angeles Terminal Land Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 68 P. 308 (1902). See
also discussion note 8 supra.
87 Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 'Cal. 2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940).
88 28 CALIF. L. REV. 769 (1940).
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on the other hand, the legislature may see fit to again amend section
1468 to include the covenants of grantees. Besides the incongruity
apparent in the grantee's freedom from obligation under the present
statutory scheme, the new version of 1468 may result in misinter-
pretation.
A noted California authority exemplifies the conflict that may
occur in the interpretation of the new amendment to section 1468.89
The comment states that although the 1968 amendment to section
1468 does not expressly repeal section 1462, the distinction between
burdens and benefits has been left without legal significance, and
that section 1468 does not distinguish between covenants between
owners of land and covenants contained in grants. Although such a
result is desirable, it appears to be an improper analysis of the
amendment.
Section 1468, as amended, expressly provides for the running
of covenants made by an owner or a grantor. Since it expressly
determines which parties' covenants will run, a strict construction
of the statute will preclude the running of a grantee's burdensome
covenants. Additionally, section 1468 requires that the covenant of
the grantor or owner be expressly beneficial to the land of the cov-
enantee.0 Clearly, the legislature had section 1462 in mind in using
this language, since 1462 also requires the covenant to be a direct
benefit on the land conveyed.9' The burden in such a case will be
personal to the original grantee and could not be enforced against his
subsequent assignees. Furthermore, the distinction between owners'
covenants and deed covenants seems clear. Under section 1468 only
grantors or owners of land may covenant to do or refrain from doing
some act on their own land. As a result, covenants in grants will run
with the land and be binding on the subsequent assignees of the parties
to the conveyance only if they are the covenants of the grantor. Sec-
tion 1468, therefore, only partially removes the distinction between
covenants by owners and those contained in grants of property.
Further difficulty in applying 1468 may arise when it is con-
sidered together with the Civil Code provisions governing restraints
and limitations. The broadened scope of section 1468 will probably
lend itself to more frequent use, creating problems in these areas. As-
sume, for example, that a covenant, which is beneficial to the land
conveyed, absolutely limited the grantor's power to sell his entire
estate or conditioned his power to sell by requiring him to seek the
89 CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, REVIEW OF SELECTED 1968
CODE LEGISLATION 33-35 (1968).
90 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1468 (West Supp. 1968).
91 'CAL. CIv. CODE § 1462 (West 1954).
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permission of the covenantee before selling.92 Section 711 of the Civil
Code93 provides: "Conditions restraining alienation, if repugnant
to the interest created are void." The California Supreme Court has
determined that this section applies equally to covenants running
with the land . 4 The court viewed attempts to unreasonably restrain
alienation in any form, whether by condition, covenant, or servitude,
as producing the same result. The result in any case amounts to
restricting marketability which is clearly contrary to social policy.
95
Finally, the temporal durability of onerous covenants should be
considered in light of the fact that other jurisdictions have statutes
which either limit to a period of time covenants and conditions, in
themselves unlimited as to time; 96 or which terminate all covenants
and conditions unlimited as to time, or those longer that the statutory
period.97 California, however, has no such provision. There are argu-
ments grounded on equitable principles which may be utilized to
render ineffective a covenant which has outlived the purpose for
which it was orginally intended. These principles may be found in
California cases dealing with equitable servitudes, where a distant
assignee of an original party to a covenant restricting the use of cer-
tain property seeks to enjoin an assignee of the other party from vi-
olating the restrictive covenant. 98 These courts reason that the physical
circumstances surrounding the restricted property have changed sub-
stantially so that the restriction reduces the marketability of the
property, rendering enforcement of the covenant inequitable. Where
such conditions exist, the courts in equity refuse to enforce the re-
strictions. Whether such an assertion can successfully be sustained
where the court is faced with a covenant clearly within the purview
of section 1468 has not yet been determined.
An early California appellate court made a distinction between
equitable relief and the contractual obligation under a condition, and
refused to allow affirmative relief quieting title free from the restric-
tive conditions even though there had been changes in the neighbor-
92 Cf. Murray v. Green, 64 Cal. 363, 28 P. 118 (1883). This case held that
provisions requiring consent of the grantor to convey in a grant of a fee was void as a
restraint of alienation. See also Prey v. Stanley, 110 Cal. 423, 42 P. 908 (1895).
93 CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1954).
94 Bonnell v. McLaughlin, 173 Cal. 213, 159 P. 590 (1916).
95 See Title Guar. & Trust 'Co. v. Garrott, 42 Cal. App. 152, 165, 183 P. 470, 475
(1919), for a stronger statement of this view.
96 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184, § 23 (1887). This section limits conditions
or restrictions, unlimited as to time, to thirty years.
97 MINN. STATS. ANN. § 500.20 (1937). This section voids all nominal conditions
and limits restrictions to 30 years.
98 Downs v. Kroeger, 200 Cal. 743, 254 P. 1101 (1927) ; Marra v. Aetna Constr.
Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940).
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hood.9 In a subsequent case before the Supreme Court of California,
the decision sustained the judgment quieting plaintiff's title to cer-
tain restrictions phrased as conditions providing for forfeiture of the
estate upon breach of said restrictions. 0 In Letteau v. Ellis,'"' the
court sustained a judgment by the trial court for the defendant dis-
allowing a forfeiture of an estate due to a breach of condition pro-
hibiting sale, rental, or use of the premises by persons of Negro
descent. Defendant argued that circumstances had changed in that
the tract was generally inhabited by persons of Negro descent and
therefore it would be inequitable to allow a forfeiture. The court
refused to adopt any of the technical niceties in view of the force
of public policy in the case.' 2
In view of the above authority, it is clear that affirmative equita-
ble relief could be granted or injunctive relief denied where there has
been a substantial change in circumstances in the use of the sur-
rounding property so as to render enforcement of a covenant under
section 1468 inequitable. But a covenant under section 1468 is one
running with the land at law so that damages are an appropriate
remedy unless they are inadequate. Can the same defense of a
changed condition be successfully asserted to avoid a judgment in
damages? There is authority to the effect that a changed condition
is not a defense to an action in damages for past breaches of a cov-
enant running with the land. 3 In Weiss v. Cord Helmer Realty
Corporation,°4 a New York court, citing a long line of precedent,
stated that an action for damages for breach of covenant may be
denied because of change of conditions in the neighborhood.'05 The
question has not yet been presented in California courts, possibly
due to the limited use of real covenants prior to 1968. Even if Cal-
ifornia elects to follow the restricted New York rule, it seems that
change in the character or conditions of surrounding property would
still have immense evidentiary effect on the actual amount of dam-
ages sustained by the covenantee suing for breach of covenant.
99 Strong v. Shatto, 45 Cal. App. 29, 187 P. 159 (1919).
100 Hess v. County Club Park, 213 Cal. 613, 2 P.2d 782 (1931).
101 122 Cal. App. 584, 10 P.2d 496 (1932).
102 "We find it needless to follow appellants' arguments on the technical rules and
distinctions made between conditions, covenants, and more restrictions. In many, if not
all, of the cases dealing with changed conditions, the terms have been used with ap-
parent disregard of the niceties of differentiation, and the reasons advanced would
have application to a resulting situation, regardless of the means of its creation." Id.
at 588, 10 P.2d at 497.
103 Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 1111, 1113 (1949).
104 140 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1955).
105 Id. at 99.
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CONCLUSION
Section 1468 of the Civil Code, as amended in 1968, is an un-
precedented attempt to codify the essential elements of the common
law of covenants. The essential difference between section 1468 and
the common law is that at common law burdens would generally run
with the land as to the assignees and successors of both grantor and
grantee, while section 1468 expressly limits their efficacy to the
assignees and successors of the grantor and an owner contracting
independently. This exclusion of grantees from such obligations ap-
pears to be an arbitrary rule. If the legislature intended this limita-
tion to avoid restraining the marketability of property, it is difficult
to understand how the marketability of a grantee's property would
be any less affected than the property of the grantor which can
now be subjected to burdensome covenants. The legislature should
further amend section 1468 to allow the running of onerous cov-
enants of the grantee. In addition, a statute should be enacted to
limit covenants, equitable restrictions, and conditions to some
reasonable period of time. Although courts of equity can nullify
the effect of equitable servitudes or allow or deny equitable relief
for covenants and conditions, there is now no method in California
by which a court can avoid a useless covenant running with the land
at law.
Juan E. Arrache, Jr.
